Towards a third wave of EC: Setting up the arguments
When addressing the process of CA, what I call the usual account is as follows: Only processes operating in the here-and-now are responsible for the process of CA and such processes are primarily bodily and neural processes. Prominent advocates of this view include Clark (2008 Clark ( , 2011 and Clark & Chalmers (1998) . I should add that the usual account of EC is what has recently been referred to as first-wave EC. Defenders of first wave EC ground their arguments for EC on the ideas that (i) external artifacts are incorporated into the cognitive system of an individual in virtue of the right kind of causal coupling, and (ii) functional similarity between the causal roles of internal and external occupiers. Alternatively to first-wave EC, defenders of second-wave EC go beyond parity and focus instead on complementarity between internal and external states and properties (Sutton 2010) and their consequent integration into a cognitive whole (Menary 2007) .
In this paper, I explore one possible route by which to gesture at but also argue for a third wave version of EC. Specifically, I follow work by second-wave EC theorists, whom are driving particular visions for a third wave of EC. In particular, I
propose one approach to the process of CA that exemplifies Sutton's recent gesture towards a third wave of EC: a version "which dissolves individuals into peculiar loci of coordination and coalescence among multiple structured media [and practices] ." (2010, p. 213) This suggestion, I believe, echoes what Menary has recently called "enculturated cognition" (EnC). EnC is the "idea that our cognitive abilities are transformed by a cognitive species of cultural practices […] . What we are able to do is augmented and transformed by the acquisition of cognitive practices." (2012, p. 148) Both of these versions for a third-wave of EC theorizing emphasize the deconstruction of the individual organism as the locus of the process of CA and allow for cultural practices as playing a central role in close coordination with neural and bodily processes.
In this paper, I aim to unpack this articulation of a third wave in the extended cognition thesis in a way that has not been done before. That is, I will discuss the process of CA in conjunction with work on the relation of composition in metaphysics. I should add that even though the debate about the process of CA is not strictly speaking about the metaphysics of composition, those involved in the discussions over CA ask structurally similar questions to those involved in debates about composition in metaphysics. In debates over composition, what is known as the special composition question (SCQ) (van Inwagen 1990) concerns the circumstances under which entities assemble or compose another entity. Indeed, both the process of CA and SCQ ask questions concerning the conditions under which entities combine to compose or assemble another entity (or whole). In so doing, both the SCQ and the process of CA take as their target the Xs -the constituents -that compose or assemble Y, and analyze the conditions under which the Xs come together to compose or assemble Y.
The first argument that I will develop turns on the fact that composition is understood as a synchronic relation of dependence, and that such a synchronic notion of composition (the SCQ) is inconsistent with the temporal dynamics inherent in the process of CA. To make this claim, I aim to establish that the restriction of the verb "compose" in the expression "the Xs compose Y" to the present tense is metaphysically problematic when considering the nature of time continuous processes such as those involved in the process of CA. This picture, familiar as it is, of X (or the Xs) composing Y at an instant t, finds no corresponding image in contemporary debates about the process of CA. In fact, when Clark states that his own targets in Supersizing the Mind (2008) are processes operating in the here-and-now, nowhere does Clark's temporal quantification "here-and-now" adhere to the assumption that the verb "compose" must be understood to imply "compose at an instant t".
Consequently, serious inquiry into the kinship between the process of CA and the SCQ must begin by scrutinizing the actual meaning of the term "now" as it is used to express the claim "the Xs compose Y now or in the here-and-now". What I shall argue is that the process of CA must be stated without implicating a notion of composing or assembling that is synchronic, where "synchronic" means that the Xs are composing Y at this very instant t. This is important, since I will show that only by problematizing the notion of synchronic composition is it possible to provide a properly motivated answer to the process of CA. That is where the metaphysical action lies in this paper 1 .
1 What I do not claim is that arguments for the process of CA assume a synchronic conception of composition or assembly. It is the usual accounts of composition in analytical metaphysics that presuppose that composition holds in a synchronic manner. What I do claim is that scrutinizing the meaning of "now" both in the debate The second argument considers the debate between Clark and Hutchins on the process of CA, with the aim of establishing that as soon as we leave room for the non-trivial role of cultural practices in the process of CA -even when the processes unfold in the here-and-now -this requires that we must look beyond the system made up of the individual agent and artifact. That is, we must include into our explanation of the process of CA features such as cognitive norms (Menary 2007 ) and patterned (cultural) practices (Hutchins 2011; Menary 2007; Roepstorff et al. 2010) . By the end of the paper what I hope to have shown is that developing a diachronic or temporally dynamic ontology for the process of CA lends support for a third wave of EC.
Overview
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 4, I consider difficulties with giving a satisfactory answer to the qualification that the verb "compose" is to be understood in the present tense -i.e., as right now some Xs are composing or assembling some Y. In section 5, I make use of the outcome of my discussion in section 4 to discuss one of Clark's examples of the process of CA, namely Gray & Fu's (2004) studies on the soft-assembly of interactive microstrategies employed by the brain to solve a given problem. In section 6, I consider the debate between Hutchins and Clark on the process of CA, where I draw up the battle lines and discuss the possibility that Clark might be wrong in privileging bodily and neural processes when explaining the process of CA 2 . In the final section, I tease out several implications of the discussion in this paper.
over the process of CA and in analytical metaphysics may shed light on how (a) to understand the meaning of "now" in debates concerning composition, and (b) to further develop the project of establishing a framework for a third-wave of EC.
2 Some readers may find it a controversial claim to state that Clark privileges bodily and neural processes when explaining the process of CA. However, in his most recent book, Supersizing the Mind (2008), Clark endorses the following position when discussing the process of CA: "Human cognitive processing (sometimes) literally extends into the environment surrounding the organism. But the organism (and within the organism, the brain/CNS) remains the core and currently most active element.
Cognition is organism centered even when it is not organism bound." (Clark 2008, p. 4. Discussing the terms "now", "right now" and "here-and-now"
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Under what circumstances do a collection of entities compose some further entity? As we saw in section 2, this is van Inwagen's SCQ (1990) . Some answer never (Rosen & Dorr 2002) , some say sometimes, yet only sometimes (Markosian 1998; Merricks 2001; van Inwagen 1990) , whereas some say always (Lewis 1986; Sider 2001) . In this section, I do not consider any of these options for when (or if) composition holds.
Instead, I start by considering difficulties with providing a satisfactory answer to the assumption that the verb "compose" in the expression "the Xs jointly combine to compose Y" is to be understood as meaning "right now, the Xs jointly combine to compose Y".
Consider, for example, what van Inwagen writes about tense and composition in
Material Beings, as he says:
"The verb 'compose' in the predicate 'the xs compose y' is to be understood as being in the present tense, and the same point applies to 'are' in 'are parts of'.
Thus, 'are parts of' and 'compose' should be read 'are now parts of' and 'now compose'. Strictly speaking […] , our definiendum should have been 'the xs compose y at t', and our "primitive" mereological predicate should have been 'x is a part of y at t. " (1990, p. 29; italics in original) 139) Or, as Clark puts the point a few pages earlier: "It is indeed primarily (though not solely) the biological organism that, courtesy especially of its potent neural apparatus, spins and maintains (or more minimally selects and exploits) the webs of additional structure that then form parts of the machinery that accomplishes its own cognizing." (2008, p. 123) Prima facie, at least, it seems to me that ordinary folk are quite familiar with the idea of "now" or "right now". For instance, when we talk about something presently taking place such as executing a tennis serve, engaging in a conversation with a friend, stirring the pasta sauce, and so on, we (implicitly) appeal to the temporal fact that something -which we may or may not engage in -is happening or taking place right now. If the folk are right, which they may or may not be, it would make the set of events to which the term "now" applies include events the temporal duration of which takes place over milliseconds, seconds, and minutes. It may only take me a few seconds to stir the pasta sauce, but it may take me several minutes to execute the proper chess move vis-à-vis the situation on the chessboard 4 .
In metaphysics things are different from that of the folk. To facilitate our discussion, consider that Markosian (2004) mentions that it is possible to distinguish between two different senses of the notion "X exists now". The first sense is what
Markosian calls for the temporal location sense, where the expression "X exists now" is meant to be synonymous with "X is present". This is the received view of presentism in the philosophy of time (Markosian 2004 ). The second sense of "X exists now", Markosian calls for the ontological sense. On this ontological sense, the expression "X exists now" is understood as shorthand for the claim that X "is now in the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers, whether it is present, like you and me, or non-present, like Socrates." (Markosian 2004, p. 48) This is the view commonly expressed as non-presentism or eternalism (Sider 2001) . Presentism and nonpresentism make competing claims about temporal ontology (Sider 2006) . Presentism is the view that, necessarily, it is always true that only present entities exist, whereas non-presentism is often formulated in an atemporal language that is hostile to presentism (Sider 2001) . That is, on the non-presentist view, past and future entities, such as dinosaurs and me 10 years from today, all exist. However, for the presentist, but not the non-presentist, there is something ontologically special about the now, in the sense that only entities that are currently present, exist.
For my purposes here, it matters little whether presentism or non-presentism is ultimately true, in that, all I wish to highlight is that both of these (hotly debated) doctrines in metaphysics are equally elusive when it comes to pinning down the precise meaning of the notion "now" as the above given definition by van Inwagen . In an action potential, the membrane becomes fleetingly permeable to sodium (Na + ) and potassium (K + ). This allows the ions to diffuse rapidly across the cell membrane." (2007, p. 50) This rapid diffusion changes the mV, in that, the action potential consists of (i) a quick increase in mV to a maximum of +35 mV, which is followed by (ii) a rapid decrease in mV to certain values below the so-called V rest , followed by (iii) a prolonged or extended after-potential period during which the neuron is less excitable (cf. Craver 2007, p. 50) Unconventional as this example might be in discussions over presentism, the question I wish to consider goes to the very heart of the ambiguity of how to understand "present" or "now". That is, is the action potential present in the presentist sense? Let us start with the (arguably) uncontroversial assumption that insofar as an action potential is present now (whatever we take "now" and "present" to imply), the action potential requires for it to be present that it unfolds over a region of space-time.
That this is uncontroversial follows from the brute fact that an action potential irreducibly consists of (i), (ii), and (iii) -that is, of (i) a quick increase in mV to a maximum of +35 mV, (ii) a rapid decrease in mV to certain values below the socalled V rest , and (iii) a prolonged or extended after-potential period during which the neuron is less excitable (cf. Craver 2007, p. 50) -and the manifestation of any of these three stages or parts take time (measured in milliseconds). The presentist is committed to the ontological claim that only present entities exist. However, consider some event -the rapid rise in mV to a maximum value of approximately +35 mVthat is happening right now. Too late! That event is over, in the sense that the mV is already rapidly declining to a value below V rest . If we take seriously that it is only present entities that exist, it follows that the first stage of the action potential in now entirely in the past. However, according to the presentist, everything that is either in the past or in the future (or both) does not strictly speaking exist; only entities that are present exist now.
I do not intend this to be a refutation of presentism; however, if this is indeed one possible outcome of presentism, it gives rise to a counter-intuitive situation: that the first stage that the action potential consists of is not -or, on longer -part of the action potential because of the fact that the mV is presently on the decline. Furthermore, what is now part of the action potential -for example, stage two -will, in a very short period of time, cease to be a part of the action potential because it will be entirely in the past. For the cognitive scientist as well as philosophers of cognitive science this result, I suspect, will be unbelievable. For example, in mechanistic philosophy of cognitive science (Bechtel 2008; Craver 2007; Machamer et al. 2000) , lower-level components and their activity give rise to higher-level functioning in virtue of the components being organized in a certain temporal, spatial as well as causal organization. But, the components themselves will not cease to be part of some higher-level phenomenon or mechanism, because they operate over different temporal frequencies.
Non-presentism will do no better for my purposes, especially because nonpresentism is stated tenselessly or timelessly, thus completely ignoring one of the central principles of research across cognitive neuroscience (Engel et al. 2001) , cognitive psychology (Ballard et al. 1997; Spivey 2007) as well as dynamical and embodied approaches to cognition (Clark 1997; Gibson 1979; van Gelder 1998; Varela et al. 1991; Wheeler 2005 ; and others), namely that cognition happens in time The central problem with both the standard synchronic notion of composition, on the one hand, and the doctrines of presentism and non-presentism, on the other, is that none make concessions to the fact that time is continuous (Spivey 2007) : one that impedes the treatment of time in terms of arbitrary, discrete step time (t1, t2, etc.).
The standard composition theorist, however, is a synchronic composition theorist in that he/she accepts that the primitive "X exists at time (or temporal interval) t" implies ontological synchronicity with respect to t. That is, the synchronic composition theorist claims that if X exists at t and if X is part of Y, then X is part of Y at t -this will be so no matter how continuous or discontinuous, transient or durable the interval and sub-intervals may be.
This practice of casting the temporal conditions under which X (or the Xs) composes Y into some lockstep or stepwise progression (t1, t2, etc.), involving a sequence of discrete states -such that X 1 composes Y 1 at t 1 , X 2 composes Y 2 at t 2 , and so on, until t n -highlights an important difference between temporally complex forms of composition (as in the process of CA) and the kind of composition most metaphysicians have in mind. To further highlight this difference, consider the following example of returning a tennis serve, in van Gelder & Port:
"The ball is approaching; you are perceiving its approach, are aware of the other player's movements, are considering the best strategy for the return, and are shifting into position to play the stroke. All this is happening at the same time.
As you move into place, your perspective on the approaching ball is changing and hence so is activity on your retina and in your visual system … the path of the approaching ball affects which strategy would be best and how you move.
Everything is simultaneously affecting everything else." (1995, p. 23; italics in original) In this example, claiming that a system S instantiates Y (returning a tennis serve), and Y is composed of some particular Xs, at a particular point in time t, really boils down to saying that during that period of time Y was composed of the Xs (or, Y was composed by the Xs). Keep in mind that we have independent reasons for being suspicious about the term "temporal instant t". Consequently, in the process of CA, we should go on to define the relationship between parts and whole as follows: over some period of time, the Xs jointly compose Y, and over that period of time, none of the Xs completely overlap Y.
With respect to the notion that either Y or X (or both) exists right now, the standard construal of composition, which implies that "now" or "right now" is to be understood in terms of ontological synchronicity is fundamentally ill-equipped for the analysis of complex and dynamical phenomena such as the example of returning a tennis serve and the temporal trajectory of an action potential. That is, nothing in the standard account of composition allows for continuous processes unfolding in real time. And both returning a tennis serve and the manifestation of an action potential are processes that unfold continuously (over a certain time-course) in real time. Clark provides the following definition of a continuous process:
"A continuous process is one in which the time-series of explanatorily relevant sub-states cannot be reduced to a sequence of discrete states with jumps in between, but instead requires a genuine continuum of states." (1998, 356) In the tennis example, it makes little sense to insist that Y is composed wholly within and only within each particular sub-interval of t and that each transition from one sub- In contrast to the standard view of composition in metaphysics, when Clark states that it is the processes, which operate in the here-and-now that assemble (or, compose) distributed ensembles, what Clark is actually saying is that it is the shortterm timescales over which most neural and bodily processes operate that during that short period of time assembled or put together some distributed cognitive whole.
Here it is enlightening to consider that the use of "right now" in the process of CA is closely related to how the folk consider the notion "right now". In EC, occurrent distributed cognitive wholes are considered to temporally unfold everywhere from 50 milliseconds and up to a few hours in the case of occurrent emotions and extended instances of decision-making. Similarly, and as I argued above, if the folk are right, then the term "right now" would refer to occurrences ranging from 2-3 minutes in their entirety to 200-300 milliseconds. That is, from processes involved in complex decision making to the completion of one saccadic eye movement. Furthermore, as with most (if not all) processes, cognitive processes have . But, regardless of how we conceptually carve up time, time is, I submit, continuous (Clark 1998; Port & van Gelder 1995; Spivey 2007 6 But these conceptual distinctions may not apply objectively. As Smart (1963) , for instance, argues against the A-theory of time, according to which "past", "present"
and "future" are understood to objectively apply to the universe, Smart argues that this way of carving up time is an entirely anthropocentric account of time. That is, distinctions of past, present, and future are distinctions made from a particular (human) point of view (Smart 1963, p. 132 The problem, in short, is that even though both the SCQ and the process of CA address the question 'under which circumstances, and by which principles' do certain entities compose or assemble other entities, the SCQ is formulated synchronically and, therefore, leaves out the temporal dynamics of actually occurring instances of composition. What we really need is a temporally quantified version of the SCQ; call it the Temporal Special Composition Question (TSCQ). Unlike the SCQ, the TSCQ does not presuppose a temporal restriction on the verb "compose" or on the verb "assemble" such that these would imply "compose or assemble at this very instant".
Instead, the TSCQ asks the question "over which timescales do processes operate when they jointly compose (or, assemble) a whole?"
In addition, "wholes" may be temporary and a one-off ensemble, a temporary and "When the production of intelligent behavior by the body-brain system is taken into account, the constraints of time and space intervene to limit what is possible." (Ballard et al. 1997, p. 723) If I am correct, the synchronic composition view treats time only as a specification of the proposition "the Xs compose Y" as taking place at a time. Thus, the locution "P is v at t" implies that the expression in place of P refers to a proposition (e.g., the Xs compose Y), the expression in place of v refers to a truth value (it is either true or false that P), and the expression in place of t refers to a particular time instant such that on the standard view "P is v at t".
To proceed further with this temporality-driven critique of synchronically formulated composition, and to hook it up with the discussion of CA, what we need, in the context of CA, is positive empirical evidence that time really matters for just how and for which processes are assembled in order to solve a given problem
7
. That is, we shall look at an example that Clark argues shows the "balanced use of a set of potentially highly heterogeneous resources assembled on the spot to solve a given problem." (2008, p. 13)
Cognitive assembly over short-term temporal frequencies
Consider, then, Clark's employment of a series of experiments conducted by Gray & Fu (2004) targeting how patterns of interactive behavior emerges at the level of embodiment and how soft-constraints -at the embodiment level -determine which of the possible strategies -for solving a given problem -are most likely to be selected given the problem or task environment.
7 One might object to my claim that dynamical cognitive science is incompatible with tenseless accounts of time, in that, you can account for change in tenseless terms as Russell famously showed. Briefly, what it is for an entity E to undergo change is for E to have a property X at t and a property Y at t 1 rather than X at t 1 . But, notice, if we want to understand (i) the evolvement of the system from t to t 1 , and (b) how that particular temporal evolvement gives rise to a property difference in E from t to t 1 , then a synchronic explanation comes up short. In the first set of experiments (Gray & Fu 2004) , subjects were presented with the task of having to program an on-screen simulation of a VCR control panel. The idea of the experiment was to manipulate the time-course and time-cost involved in accessing the information required to program a VCR in order to assess whether the task environment facilitates or discourages the use of "knowledge in-the-world for knowledge in-the-head." (Gray & Fu 2004, p. 364) In the experiment subjects were divided into three groups. In the first group (the Free-Access condition), the information was clearly visible in front of the user so that she freely could access the information via saccadic eye movement. In the second group (the Gray-Box condition), the window was partly visible, although the required information (about channel, start time, etc.) was covered with a gray box. To uncover the information the user had to remove the gray box via a mouse click on the gray box. The final group (the Memory-Test condition), who, unlike the others, had previously memorized all the information required, had to remove the gray box and type in the necessary information. In order to determine to time-course and time-cost involved in each of these three conditions, Gray & Fu analyzed two components: first, the time needed for perceptual-motor access to the information; and second, the time needed for memory retrieval (see Fig. 1 ). What Gray & Fu found was that time costs of information retrieval, measured in milliseconds, are what determine the combination of processes (biological memory, motor actions, shifts of attention, etc.) assembled to solve the problem. As Clark puts it:
"[The] subjects settled on whatever strategy yielded (at that phase of the programming) the least cost (measured by time) information retrieval. In fact, they did this even when the fastest mix of resources sacrificed perfect knowledge in the world for imperfect knowledge in the head. Only when the inthe-world data could be accessed with less effort (measured by time) than the data stored in biological memory was it recruited and were calls to the external store "built into" the dominant strategy." (2008, p. 119) Estimates (in ms) of perceptual-motor and memory retrieval effort by condition Condition Perceptual-motor access Memory retrieval
Free-Access
Gray-Box
Memory-Test 500 1,000-1,500
1,000-1,500 500-1,000 500-1,000 100-300 the short-term timescales of neural operations -note also our discussion of the action potential earlier -neural processes cannot be completely and wholly present at any single instant. That is because neural processes, like processes in general, are temporally extended in nature. For my purposes, then, the real power of the example discussed by Clark is that it shows that even on the short-term timescales over which neural and bodily processes operate, it is ontologically diachronic all the way down.
We have here a consequence for those involved in the debate over the process of CA in EC and for metaphysicians with a synchronic persuasion. First, and to repeat what I said in section 2, insofar as Clark states that it is the processes that operate
here-and-now that orchestrate the assembly of hybrid, distributed cognitive wholes, this claim really boils down to saying that it is the short-term timescale of bodily and neural processes that during that period of time orchestrated the assembly process of some distributed cognitive whole, and should not be mistaken as genuine evidence for the processes actually assembling some distributed cognitive whole at a time instant t.
As I understand Clark's position -or, the best way to interpret Clark's insistence on the timescale of the here-and-now -is precisely that it is the processes that unfold over short-term, but varied, timescales that assemble or compose distributed cognitive processes and/or systems (Clark 2011) . Second, if the metaphysics of composition is to apply to dynamical processes involved in the process of CA, then the synchronic account of composition is ill equipped. Thus, the process of CA must be stated entirely such that it does not implicate assumptions about composition as ontologically synchronic. "It is indeed primarily (though not solely) the biological organism that, courtesy especially of its potent neural apparatus, spins and maintains (or more minimally selects and exploits) the webs of additional structure that then form parts of the machinery that accomplishes its own cognizing." (2008, p. 123) There are two assumptions at work in Clark's project. The first assumption is that only processes operating here-and-now (or right now) are responsible for the assembly of distributed cognitive processes or systems. The second assumption is that the processes most directly responsible for such assembly are bodily and/or neural processes. With respect to the example above, these two assumptions highlight that it is the short-term temporal frequencies at the embodiment level, made up of perceptual, motor, and cognitive processes, which primarily compose higher-level cognitive products.
Cognitive assembly
However, this combination is not the only coherent and live option in the literature. That is, if we call Clark's first assumption for "A", and call the second That is how I read his key suggestion that "both the constraints of cultural practices and the malleable internal microdemons can be seen as elements of a single adaptive system". But while I agree that these are indeed (also) elements of a single long-term adaptive system, that does nothing to diminish the conceptual separation between the long-term evolution of cultural practices, the medium-term effects of my immersion in such practices, and the short-term Thus, depending on how one interprets Hutchins' position, it is possible to place him in either option two or three. Now, even though I say that all three combinations are coherent, it should be clear that any one of these is not free of difficulty. In addition to
Clark's criticism of Hutchins' hypothesis of enculturated cognition, Hutchins has argued that the first combination -the one Clark opts for in much of his latest work (Clark 2008 (Clark , 2011 ) -is problematic, in the sense that endorsing the view that only bodily and neural processes are responsible for the process of CA excludes from view that much of the "heavy-lifting" -as Hutchins in fond of calling it -in the assembly of distributed cognitive ecologies is performed by cultural practices that unfold over longer timescales than those of the here-and-now.
A similar sort of ambiguity is present in Clark's authorship, especially when one compares some of Clark's earlier work such as Being There (1997) " (1997, p. 191) Thus, whereas the first set of quotes puts Clark squarely in the first option, this latter set of quotes puts him firmly in the second option.
It is certainly true that one way to read these ambiguities in both Clark's and
Hutchins' work is that they indicate that not any one of the three options can be defended on metaphysical ground. That is, it is an empirical question just how often and how much of the assembly work is performed through the combination of (A) and ( That is, even in the here-and-now, across the short-term timescales of hours, minutes, seconds, and so on, the process of EC is not primarily driven/orchestrated by bodily or neural processes but it also significantly morphed and sculptured by socially embedded and culturally transmitted practices. engineering. Earthworms engage in burrowing activities, often resulting in a transformation of the structure and chemistry of the soil in which they live (Laland et al. 2000, p. 134) . This burrowing activity is important because earthworms, prior to their presence on land, were originally aquatic organisms (Laland 2004, p. 321) . As
Laland says: only by "co-opting the soils that they inhabit and the tunnels they build to serve as accessory kidneys that compensate for their poor structural adaptation " (2004, p. 321) can earthworms tackle the physiological demands of a different water-and salt-balance on land.
Many organisms not only alter and transform their environmental niches pragmatically. Much niche construction is importantly a mode of epistemic engineering, in the sense that active niche-constructors modify and alter the informational character of the environment (Sterelny 2010, p. 470) . For instance, ants lay scent trails between nest and food source. Humans off-load information "onto" the environment so as to ease the burdens on "internal" memory processing (Donald 1991) . Other organisms, like hawks, simply choose the best spot from which to maximize the view of their hunting territory. In a comprehensive study on the "intelligent use of space," Kirsh argues that rearranging spatial relations between environmental resources transforms the problem solving space by reducing the descriptive complexity of the task environment (1995, 2009) . Especially in the human lineage, the ramification of epistemic engineering is the establishment of a cumulatively constructed cognitive-developmental niche (Sterelny 2003 (Sterelny , 2010 .
Epistemic (and pragmatic) engineering is not only cognition-enhancing in the heat of some problem-solving scenario, since some modifications to the physical and informational environment are transmitted downstream to the following generation.
As Sterelny argues, "cumulative downstream epistemic engineering" implies transmission of both socio-cultural structures and ecological and technical know-how or expertise enabling the transmission and acquisition of new knowledge (2010, p. 470 Here it is not primarily bodily and neural processes that compose a bartender's ability to get the job done but rather neural processes in coordination with normative, cultural practices that jointly come together to assemble such abilities.
Implications
The combination of ontological diachronicity with the TSCQ implies that whenever the statement "the processes involved in the process of CA are those processes operating in the here-and-now" is made, it follows that we must understand this statement as expressing "the processes involved in the process of CA are those processes operating in the here-and-now during that period of time". This particular view, it seems to me, is the implicit view of several philosophers of cognitive science as well as some cognitive scientists themselves (see e.g., Ballard et al. 1997; Beer 2000; Chemero 2009; Clark 1998b; Kirchhoff 2013; Spivey 2007; Varela et al. 2001;  and others). One important implication this has for any synchronic notion of composition -such as the SCQ -is that not only is it ill fitted to analyze temporally complex phenomena; it can never be made to analyze such temporal phenomena simpliciter.
Once we make room for a robust diachronic account of the circumstances under which entities of different kinds assemble or compose another entity, and once room has been made for the pivotal role of cultural practices in this process of assembly or composition, this requires (non-trivially) that we look beyond the system made up of the individual agent and artifact. Notice that there is nothing special about endorsing option 1 above: only processes operating in the here-and-now are responsible for the process of CA and such processes are primarily bodily and neural processes. Indeed, prominent advocates of this view include Clark (2008 Clark ( , 2011 and Clark & Chalmers I wish to finish this paper by considering whether it is possible to apply this metaphysical contribution to the debate over the process of CA to settle any disputes in the literature. I think that this is entirely possible. Consider, for example, how
Hutchins attempts to push Clark into a strictly neural-oriented position with regards to the process of CA by exploiting an apparent bias in the phrase "on the spot". As
Hutchins says:
"According to Clark, this exploitation happens "on the spot," but the constraints that determine which resources are exploited and how they are related to one another is not entirely formed "on the spot". The "on the spot" phrase highlights the opportunistic nature of cognitive systems. However, without additional discussion, this wording may also bias the solution toward the biological brain by isolating the activity from the context of cultural historical processes." (2011, p. 441) One cause for concern about Hutchins' interpretation of the phrase "on the spot" is that there is nothing about the phrase "on the spot" that conceptually entails a commitment to the view that it is the brain that is the most active element in the assembly of distributed cognitive products. An example will make this more concrete.
Consider, again, a passage from Hutchins: Whichever processes combine to produce the capacity to see a star constellation do so on the spot -on the timescales of seconds or, perhaps, minutes. The question is: over which other timescales would such processes be active?
Instead of juxtaposing the short-term timescales and long-term timescales (e.g., historical time-scales), Hutchins would be better off arguing that there is no problem with depicting the process of CA as unfolding over the short-term timescales of the here-and-now, provided that you leave room for the central roles of cultural practices (or, history embedded in those practices) in the processes that unfold here-and-now.
Insofar as the meaning of "now" is such that it may, in the right circumstances, include a dynamical interval of time, and insofar as the cultural practices within which the cognitive task is carried out unfolds within such a dynamical interval of time, then cultural practices may be part of the processes assembling some cognitive ability. That is the real point that one will be able to make by opting for combination (A) and not (B) above. Consequently, Hutchins cannot appeal to the notion "on the spot" in order to assert that Clark privileges the brain in the process of CA, since the meaning of "on the spot" is contingent -as I have argued -on the time and place of the utterance.
Conclusion
What I hope to have shown in this paper is that when considering the process of CA,
that is, when we analyze over which timescales certain processes combine to compose distributed cognitive products, there is no ontologically synchronic instant t at which that is possible. I wish to finish this paper by pointing out that metaphysical analysis cannot settle the question over which timescales the processes involved in the process of CA are predominantly active. This is a matter of empirical investigation. However, by scrutinizing the metaphysics of what it means for certain Xs to compose a certain Y now, it is possible, I think, to turn what might look like a metaphysical dispute into a productive recipe for empirical research and to set certain constraints for how such research must be carried out.
